# IDC

Data: 11-01-2025 21:43:14

## Lista de Vídeos

1. [Developments in Korean Platform Competition and Regulation](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V61MDCMG8Mo)

## Transcrições

### Developments in Korean Platform Competition and Regulation
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V61MDCMG8Mo

Idioma: en

so welcome uh to the webinar today uh
this webinar is co-hosted by USC
Marshals initiative on digital
competition and soul National University
AI policy initiative uh my name is Yong
Lim and I am uh the director of snu AI
policy initiative and I will be
moderating uh the webinar together with
Professor hang at SN news business
school um today's webinar focuses on
recent developments in Korean platform
competition and Regulation and as
everybody knows uh the kfdc came out
with a new legislative proposal uh last
month that did uh depart from its
initial or previous position on on
platform regulation namely moving away
from a designation scheme to a
presumption uh based uh regulation of
platforms and it also uh selected six uh
service
sectors and identified four categories
of conduct that it would specifically
Target through the proposed law now
there has been a lot of reactions both
positive and negative
on this new proposal uh the kftc hasn't
released uh its text yet uh but there is
a lot of definitely uh issues uh that we
can and should discuss so this webinar
uh will try to do that uh today and we
have a stellar list of uh panelists and
I will briefly introduce them to you so
uh Sujin n is an associate professor at
the international econ economics and Law
Department of hanguk University of
Foreign Studies in sou Korea she was a
visiting scholar at USC school during
the past Academic Year Chona Kim our
next panelist is a partner at the Korean
Law Firm P Kim Lee and has a wealth of
experience in anit trust law spanning
over more than two decades she had
served in various leadership and
advisory roles including Vice chair of
the ipba antitrust committee and is
currently a member of the IBA antitrust
committee cartel working
group our third panelist hang Lee is the
current Dean and professor at Korea
University School of Law and a director
at the icr Law Center his academic
interests cover
competition law intellectual property
rights among other things Dean Lee was
recognized as a leading anit trust
academic bias peers in gcrs 2022
survey and last but not least Yong Jin
Chong is co-chair of Kim Chang's anti
trust and competition law practice where
he has represented major Global Tech
companies in various cases he also leads
the firm's International Trade practice
and recently published a book on
International merger control titled
competition law regulation in the era of
De
globalization so we have definitely uh a
wealth of experience and expertise in
the panel and uh we look forward to
having a very uh Lively and informative
uh discussion so H I'll uh hand it over
to you to start off the discussion
Jo I think you need to
unmute oh thank you um hello everyone my
name is H Kang kok and I'm an associate
professor at snu business school where I
joined just last month and before coming
to snu I spent five years as an associ
associate professor at USC Marsha and I
continue to serve as an Affiliated
faculty at USC Marshal's initiative on
digital competition which is one of the
host institutions today so a little bit
of the background again the Korean FTC
announced its new policy on platforms
shifting from an ex anti designation
based scheme towards an expost
presumption scheme in determining
platforms with the market dominance and
it will also regulate the for different
types of conduct abusing their market
dominance however concerns arise as the
new approach May simply sacrifice the
advantages of predictability provided
through the ex anti designation scheme
while still suffering from the
disadvantages of that namely the
chilling effect on Innovation so my
first question is for an attorney
chongyong Jin so EU digital markets Act
has two different pillars one is the
designation of platforms and the second
is the X anti prohibition of the conduct
so should we view the two regulatory
tools go hand inand with one another or
as the two sides of the flip single
coin thank you uh thank you uh Professor
leam for a nice introduction and then um
you know Professor um you um for the
introd remark uh there have been a lot
of discussions and then uh if I will you
know first about the distinction between
ex anend and expost regulations um you
know apparently kfdc proposal adopts a
um you know legal presumption scheme as
part of the exposed an trust enforcement
uh
Visa uh ex an regulations um it
epitomized by the so-called designation
process
um it appears that the C this proposal
may be viewed as not a typical uh exante
regulations in the sense that they have
a legal presumption not you know having
uh designation
process but apart from this semantic
categorization um xantic boost um
categorization they kept the proposal TS
to have the similar effects as
designations once enacted um of course
we need to you know see you know how the
implementing regulations will be uh you
know framed but KC would conduct a
market survey uh once uh this new piece
of legislation is enacted and have a
list of companies subject to uh legal
presumption for
dominance so uh if this is the case k
this proposal would have a similar
issues that business are concerned about
as exante
regulations I I think that there are
multiple path for what we call a
preemptive anit
trust uh to deal with a unique
challenges in the digital
Market uh you know first uh
udma um as you all know is the strongest
xant
regulation uh
designation plus no need to show anti
competiveness
uh it explicitly states that there is no
efficiency
defense plus periodic compliance report
obligations so by all indication it's
just a sectoral regulation applied to uh
digital platform
Market as for UK
dmca uh it's a bit less stringent than
udma in a sense that it will tailor the
behavioral obligations to individual
companies after some Market
survey uh however the framework uh is
all the same
designation plus uh no need to show
anti- competitiveness up front plus
periodic compliance
report um you know producing compliance
report is a huge undertaking
uh I looked at um you know some of the
um you know public virsion uh you know
composite report uh is more than you
know 300
Pages as for the German competition law
19a the least distri of all three uh of
course you know this has a component of
designation but it has to show the
anti-c competitiveness no automat Pro
your your
provation um un like in eud others and
then there is no uh you know specific
obligation for periodic compliance
report so you know German competition
law is not a typical exan model but a
extension of a traditional competition
model although it has some element of
designation but um the very fact that
the competion authority has to show the
inte comp effects is um more or less
falling under a
traditional um exposed and a trust
model according to drag report uh
especially in the section of revamping
competition
section uh it proposed a combination of
exante Regulation and expost
enforcement it also states that exan
regulation should play a supplemental
role not the main stay of regulation on
ni
trust so you know I think um there are
again there are multiple ways to
address uh significant and persistent
even structural and a trust issues uh we
should not think that KC should strive
toward effectively making current
proposal as exent regulation such as udm
outpos
here back to you uh Professor King
thank you thank you for sh sharing your
insights um do you have any comments or
questions from the
panelists so okay um if not for the
interest of time I will move on to the
second question but we will have some qu
sessions at the end of the session and
we have seven more questions awaiting us
so the next question is a bit more on
the designation um process so the next
question is for Professor Ian um the
designation approach is actually based
on the gatekeeper status or the cross
Market significance so how is it
different from the conventional dominant
Market position approach is it just a
matter of degree in terms of the market
share or control or is there any
fundamental difference between the two
concepts and why are they important to
competition
policy okay thank you Professor G uh I
think there are some fundamental
differences between the notion of a
dominant
position as adopted in conventional
anti-rust
laws uh
that assumes a
given definition of relevant
market and the difference is that the
gatekeeper adopting in the uh exan
regulatory
scheme as we have seen in the case of
EU it is concerned about the economy
with the crops Market
impact so the notion of gatekeeper seems
to implicate a broader L range of
business players in the scope of digital
platforms given the businesses fi of
multi-sided
Market of global
range uh differently the notion of a
market down position is supposed to be
devoted to the enforcement of
conventional exposed antitrust
regulation it is typically designed and
works to screen out a small and
excessive numbers of potential cases by
small businesses that are not considered
to have capabilities or possibilities to
restrict Market
competition so I think the difference
between the two notion seems to have
something to do with the background or
actual concerns of exante
Regulation so what is behind the
concerns about big take
I think
as Mr John already stated there should
be
something that can
justify the sacrifice of efficiency that
has been that has pursued by the
traditional antitrust laws for a long
time so the concern maybe something more
than just Market
concentration so in the case of EU EU in
addition to the official justifications
of overcoming limitations of
conventional and existing antitrust
regulations the EU reclaims that it is
important to achieve digital sovereignty
against Global or American big tchs
so it goes far beyond the traditional
efficient gos that we the existing
anestrous law has considered the most
important very similarly in the United
State the new brandise
school they argue that they want to
pursue the economic political and
social uh
reasons that has not been adopted in the
regulatory
scheme regulatory scheme and tools of
the traditional an
laws so in
Korea I think it is not
clear what should be the justifications
of the a possible exan regulation
because in Korea we already have
extensive regulatory tools of exan
Regulation
for example we have a
diverse regulatory tools of the general
concentration we have a various tools of
evolution over the So-Cal capil or abuse
of a superior bargaining
position so I can say that the kftc is
already equipped with the most powerful
range of regory
tools so the uh new introduction of
other weapons as we have seen in case of
EU or UK or German Germany I think it is
not necessary at the at the present time
at most we can achieve a same results by
strengthening existing anti laws if
necessary well in this sense I agree
with the recent anouncement of the QFC
and they say they give up the
introduction of a regulatory scheme of
exante Regulation or exante designation
of the big
TX thank
you thank you um any quick comments or
questions from the
panel um b i I have a um a quick
question uh because you're also a former
KDC official and I wanted um the
audience to perhaps have an opportunity
to to accurately understand where the
kfdc stands right now so the KFC in its
uh new
proposal uh stated that it would Target
um it didn't use the word gatekeeper but
it did say that it was going to Target
you might say literally overbearing
market dominance platforms so when when
we say overbearing market dominance now
it did say 60 % well it did um up the
concentration ratio a bit but does that
mean then would it be something similar
to a gatekeeper or is this just more of
a uh Stronger dominant position so so
where where does the KFC currently stand
between those two uh the spectrum of of
quote unquote uh Market
positions very good and interesting
question my answer is that uh I don't
know it should be something in between
the traditional D position position and
the gatekeeper as adopted in the
European dma but because they did not
disclose the actual provisions of the
amendment of The Cent In Laws well I'm
not sure about what they actually have
in mind so but what I can say this is
something between the two uh Notions
given
right thank you so much um so it seems
that the gatekeeper concept is
fundamentally different from the market
dominance and we need more than just
Market concentration so so back on the
track of discussing um the designation
part so my next question is directed to
an attorney gimana so there are two main
approaches to regulating the designated
platforms I think the first first one is
to establish a very high level General
comprehensive principles or the second
sissifying an individual menu of
prohibitions or rules and there can be
some on place in between so could you
could you please share your views on
what legislative approach will be
optimal for regulating platforms and
their
competition okay uh thank you Professor
G for the introduction and and excellent
question before moving on into detail uh
for those of you who are not familiar
with the Korean competition law I will
give you a very high level explanation
on the structure of the current
legislation and firstly as mentioned by
Professor hang Le kftc has know the
multiple tools to regulate online
platforms already so we are we have this
unilateral conduct iion both abuse of
market dominance like in other
jurisdictions and we also have these
unfair thread practices as well so and
on top of that kftc has its own review
guidelines for abuse of dominance on the
Trade Practices and and it issued a
special guidelines for online platforms
as well but there are multiple tools and
layers of regulations already on
place and uh in terms of the legisl
ative approach whether it's
comprehensive or specific prohibition I
think the current uh Korean legislation
is a hybrid of the two basically we we
are in a specific prohibition regime in
that uh the highest level of legislation
our primary competition law Monopoly
regulation and fair trade act the
mrfa list of a specific conduct
categories in it the for abuse of Market
dominance there are five specific
conduct categories and unfair Trade
Practices there are nine specific
conduct categories but there is also one
catchup provision for unfair Tri
practices and we' I'd like to focus on
abuse of dominance for today's uh
discussion that there are lower role for
the mrfa there's enforcement decree in
the enforcement decree there are two
types of conduct categories for three
conduct categories
we have only the specific prohibitions
but two other conduct categories there
is a general provision but uh but uh
there's also a hybrid of the two there
is a specific prohibition and one
General
provision as well these uh two general
Provisions are supplemented by the KFC's
review guidelines and KFC's review
guidelines for these two conduct
categories
provides four specific conduct
categories and there is a four conduct
categor seems like a catro provision but
it's again limited very specific conduct
careways in four and six six and four
respectively so all in all it seems like
we have taken a specific prohibition
approach and uh KFC's online platform
guidelines new guidelines also has this
specific six service sectors and four
specific comp conduct categories and the
four conduct categories although it
seems new on its face other than a tying
so it's restriction on Multi homing
forcing mfn and self- preferencing all
these
four again fall under at least one of
the existing five conduct categories
under the law so up to now we have this
specific provision legim supplemented by
the general Provisions so we see
historically
uh there these broad uh provision like
exclusionary conduct or undue
interference with business activities
are applied to new types of Conduct in
in emerging uh Industries so I think the
proposed amendment by the kftc is not
different from we what we have seen so
far for example uh in in Industries like
new Industries kftc starts its
investigation and imposes sanctions and
these precedents are included in its
review guidelines and we see more
clarity in this review guidelines and uh
kftc recently try to try to amend the
mrfa is like a pass to these
guidelines know show adding up to the
higher level of legislation included in
the low level so personally I think the
target areas and prohibited conduct
remain the same as in the Current Online
platform guidelines it sees the more
higher level of legislation and same as
the hybrid of comprehensive and specific
prohibition so I think there is a new
need for a know this new regist
structure for online platforms only so I
think we are on the past the same
historic pth uh as as the kftc has done
to achieve both Clarity and flexibility
flexibility in in this
legislation okay any quick comments or
questions from the panel um so I I have
again another followup and um I think
most of I mean everyone would agree with
you uh in terms of well what's really
new right it's the six fa sectors the
four conduct categories they're all
already in the current online platform
guidelines which which are actually
being enforced by the kftc and the Kaka
Mobility case in in neighor and in
coupon Etc so uh that begs the question
of well why then this legislation right
and as you said it does elevate this uh
quote unquote internal guideline um into
actual law and I think the KFC chairman
uh Han recently said or he he emphasized
that the real purpose was to speed up
enforcement that the the the logic was
that this would help the kfdc to to push
cases forward more rapidly in a more
timely manner and U my question to you
as a practitioner on the ground um do
you agree with that assessment do you
think that um elevating uh these rules
into actual law from guidelines would
then make a difference does that really
change the game um your views on on
that okay uh thank you for the good
question of Professor im as a
practitioner I understand the uh
chairperson of the CF remark that he
wants to expedite investigation
process but as a PR practitioner we see
we've seen these in the past as well in
the similar cases where the kftc
escalated
its guidelines onto the law uh in terms
of due process uh rights there has been
a development and Improvement on it but
I I don't see any change in speed of
Investigation it really depends on the
will of the r agency and how well
equipped they are but sometimes in our
situation it is affected by you know
political situations or or complaints by
small business owners or other consumers
but I don't think the change in the
level of legislation will affect the
speed speed of Investigation or result
of the
investigation but one one thing we have
concerns is it is new provision on the
possible injunction injunction or order
by the kftc it's a one feature of the
tfc's amendment proposal which which are
similar to ex an regulation
so if he he has in he has something know
injunctive order in mind I think it has
some effect on possible speed of
enforcement or correcting the
anti-competitive harm in the market but
other than that I don't see any much
difference that's my qu that's my
response thank
you thank you um I think with the
uncertainty around whether I a specific
platform will be considered or presumed
as a dominant um platform coupled with
um so all the other things including the
burden of proof transition I think it'll
be really um interesting important issue
and I think we will have further
discussion in the later questions but
let me now move now move on to the
fourth question to Professor namin so I
think there are many different policy
goals tools and
for regulating platform and I think they
include promoting competition or
protecting privacy and data or
protecting consumers supporting small
businesses and preventing unfair
practices in the market so for example
in Korea I think the previous government
um highlighted um the addressing the
unfair Trade Practices while the current
government is focusing more on the like
promoting competition in the market
and then the EU Digital Services act Esa
also covers a range of topics so in your
view Professor namsu Jin which area of
the platform
regulation that the um the competition
Authority should
prioritize um well thank you uh for
professor liy and Kang and also
Professor s for having me here um it's
an honor um so a the question is uh is
an important one and I'm not sure if I
am you know equipped to answer and and
sort of uh juggle which policy H should
you know get the priority uh it deserves
but um what I wanted to say was um two
things so um because of pervasiveness
pervasiveness of platforms I think um
there are many many important issues
that arise and just because I teach
undergraduate students um I you know
often conduct survey on my students and
ask them um if they the generation that
you know
supposedly uh are most used to these
types of platforms and and hence can
maybe benefit um more from the use of
these platforms are keenly aware of a
lot of the issues they feel very
strongly about data privacy
interoperability with their wall Garden
devices you know ads on platforms and
how expensive is to remove ads and they
feel very strongly about it and and and
I think most of the policy priorities
that you listed in your questions
deserve uh uh attention um today in
Korea I wanted to highlight that um the
hot issue although there are hot issues
everywhere really the hot issue I feel
um is that there are C related
grievances um from mostly uh
self-employed uh restaurants um who
complain about certain practices uh
conducted by the very successful Korean
delivery platforms and when uh Nos and
Civic groups uh survey on platform
abuses most complaints do relate to um
the platform's treatment of its business
users um whether it's e-commerce
platform de delivery platforms and since
it has a lot of you know um
political implications I think a lot of
resources are focused on those uh capil
abuse of uh Superior position type
issues in
Korea um one thing I also wanted to note
about that which is uh I find
particularly interesting is that the
kftc which is not only a competition
Authority but it has other um laws and
objectives uh under its mandate uh has
actually been playing a role in
Collective negotiation process between
um the small mom and pop Korean
restaurants who are complaining about
the commission rates of Korean uh
delivery platforms um and the online
platform so uh they are sort of
collectively negotiating on the
appropriate rates uh for delivery and um
I find it interesting that uh the kftc
which also has the the Hat of
um perhaps uh fighting against uh
collusive practices uh are sort of
leading um maybe not leading but are
involved in a process where um the
competitors from the industry are
getting together to um a lower rates um
my understanding is that currently um
the delivery platforms are are are
offering uh staggered rates because the
complaint is based on on the previously
very high rate so they are now off
offering uh an alternative to that and
the reports from the the news keep
saying well there you know um a couple
of delivery platforms were okay with
that um there is an hold out uh of that
approach which makes this uh Collective
negotiation difficult which seems to
suggest that there's certain pressure to
get everyone together to kind of uh
settle on a lower uh commission for the
restaurants um and um so that is
something that's not I think um that's
going on in Korea um what I think
personally as a second note I think is
important for long-term Economic
Development and competition is in Korea
is really the question of access um I
think you know uh protecting reasonable
access to key platform services and
Technologies is very important um
especially with uh online platforms that
hold major Technologies uh such as AI
Technologies and that continued scrutiny
is necessary on um blocking reasonable
requests for Access and exclusive
dealing agreements and and I also am
open to uh interop operability measures
that uh may be required by law but this
um I want to you know make sure that
this is not something that I think
competition law should be in charge of I
think it's more uh a a you know new law
or regulation that may
uh the better uh solution for the access
problem but um I personally think it is
something that has a role in competition
policy not all but you know it has some
role uh and it's I personally think is
really important going forward into the
future that we have healthy um you know
growth uh in our digital
sector thank you thank you any quick
questions or comments from the panel
and I personally think that access issue
that you mentioned um um just mentioned
will be increasingly important and I'm
really curious like who will be the
right um authority to regulate or govern
all these kind of issues um and I will
look forward to hear more from you if we
have some time at the end of the seminar
but with that I will hand over my mic to
Professor
imong all right so um sui I'm going to
direct another question to you and it's
in a sense related to uh your first
intervention um now as you as you know
the recent sped of Google cases
including the search andit trust cases
in the US actually focuses on exclusive
dealing and access and so maybe there
may be some movement there um related to
competition but you know going back to
platform regulation um
based on your identifi identification of
you know the c um issue and access um do
you think that the KFC's proposal um to
to focus on as uh Attorney Kim pointed
out tying um mfn um uh self-
preferencing uh Etc um do or
multi-homing restrictions do you think
that the focus is sufficient or um maybe
are there any other practices that the
kfdc or Regulators should put their
focus
on um yeah thank you for the question uh
well I think based on um what um uh Miss
Kim has already uh addressed about how
the existing laws have covered these
conduct and existing laws um they don't
necessarily spell out self- preferencing
but they have been used so the the KFC
has um a history of interpreting um
their statutory basis quite broadly so
um if you're asking if this LW list is
complete enough um I am tempted to say
uh with what's there there it may be
interpreted very broadly to cover um
conduct that are related but not
something that might you know fit just
it's not the conduct that we imagine
when we hear the word multi-homing or
self- preferencing it might be something
um that could be interpreted as such um
and the why don't I haven't looked at
the text yet I don't think we have but
um uh the press release seems to include
the word Etc uh in many of its places so
um I wonder if um this is not just their
complet and final list they may add um
something else um but um yeah as you
mentioned if I had to think of something
um I did think of exclusive agreements
um as you said based on you know the
Google case in the US and also because
of the focus on self- preferencing now
that these big tech companies are not
allowed to use their internal divisions
to you know uh basically uh do business
um I wonder if they will uh establish
you you know long-term partners that are
outside of their company structure to
kind of continue to do what they do in
terms of what we refer to as self
preferencing and those will come as in
the form of exclusive agreements um Etc
so that's something that I think is
important um another point I wanted to
address about access uh was the law and
refusal to deal um it's something that I
feel like a lot of agencies want to use
and EXP banned but have uh difficulties
doing and in Korea too in terms of
abusive uh dominance refusal to deal is
very difficult it has high standards as
outlined by the posto case but Korea as
uh Professor uh lee mentioned we do have
a refusal to deal under unfair Trade
Practices which I think presents a lower
bar and it's something that is not
within the framework of the proposed
amendments because the Amendments uh
only um address the abuse of dominance
but I think it's something a tool that
has you know
has has a lot of
potential um and it's something that I
also wanted to include uh while it's not
covered it's something that um that is
important in my opinion going forward
thank
you all right so for the benefit of time
I'm going to go on and move on to the
next question but we will have an
opportunity to react and and um discuss
uh later uh
so I'm going to um direct the question
to Dr Chung um and this relates to
privacy and um competition and uh
so we did discuss a bit about privacy
being another uh sector of platform
regulation uh that is important um and
there are debates whether competition
law should or should not have a say in
in what and how much privacy should be
protected
now um there are various approaches to
handling the relationship between
competition and um privacy uh and as you
uh saw in the bundes Calum um Facebook
case uh now there's you know the
European position is that the
competition Authority can consider
violations of privacy law gdpr but it
does also have to do a competition
analysis and so um setting aside you
know the propriety of
competition um intervening into privacy
related policy or or or setting privacy
protection as one of its goals um I
think we also need to think about
jurisdictional issues between different
agencies and so um for example in Korea
There Is the personal uh information
protection commission and there is the
kftc and so if the kftc were to in the
name name of platform regulation and
competition um aine on or incorporate
privacy related concerns into uh their
enforcement um how should or how could
they uh manage the relationship with the
pipc what should be some of the
guardrails or or uh guidance that you
would give or suggest uh for uh those
two agencies
um Dr I think you need to
unmute uh thank you very much for um
your excellent questions I think that
this is Uncharted Territory you know
people haven't thinking about um this a
uh you know issue of intersection
between anat trust and privacy
regulations um you know as you know data
you know privac law and anit Trust uh
law are distinct legal disciplines uh
data privacy doesn't uh really fit um
neatly with the uh anat trust and other
um
existing uh in doctrinal areas of
law the overarching goal of anti trust
is uh competition and you know goal of
uh you know propy regulations is a
preservation of uh personal
Integrity uh so you know this distinct
legal
disciplines uh have evolved um without
really much regard to each other uh but
you know as you uh you know pointed out
um J bundis car um you know took an
issue with the uh you know Facebook's uh
cross cross platform data
aggregation um uh so uh and then the if
we look at the you know European
commission's uh eud dma you have uh
multiple uh you know you know components
um about you know addressing the priy
practices in the article you know five
and six of the udma and then also uh UK
uh tmca also has some elements and then
uh even German um uh cons uh law also
has some uh you know element um in it as
so you know there have been a
recognition that um there have been
certain areas where competition law
plays a role um but the you know like I
said we need to think about you know you
know what um the role um you know each
uh
agency uh should play um the you know
Korean uh privacy um information
a person information agency uh you know
has a already um demonstrated it
abilities to address uh you know some of
the important PR practices questions and
if you look at um Korean uh privacy
regulations you have some element
regarding the data
portability uh
issues so you know I think that um the
you know uh you we we uh uh you know
should not um the you know assume that
um you know there are a lot of uh the
areas where uh competition law plays a
role and in addressing um you know some
of the issues uh related to uh you know
you know Parts related competition um
you know even uh take an example of the
German Bund on you know case regarding
you Facebook it's not really pure you
know as you know pure uh anat trust case
um uh he made a reference to Judd
PL um you know and then the the way the
German competition law is
structured uh is to address a a a
specific situations relating to um you
know other areas of law so that's where
uh the case came in uh so in
Korea uh you know you know
the we uh uh need to think about from
governance perspective we need to think
about how both agencies can work
together uh to address the unique
challenges uh priv practice would uh you
know present uh rather than um you know
just in uh you know some other uh legis
proposal you know pending National
Assembly uh there is a reference to
private practices you know following the
model of you know EU GD EU dma in the
legislative proposal I I think that we
need to think further you know about you
know what each agency can play Given uh
the you know charart record of their
enforcement you know for now and how you
know these two areas uh will evolve in
the
future I I think it's going to be
particularly challenging as you said
when when multiple agencies meet on an
issue for example the um European Court
said that um the DG comp should listen
to or consult with the gdpr authorities
on whether there was a violation of
privacy and then the question
immediately becomes where um can they
can they have a different opinion for
example um and it's not a black and
white issue for example the severity or
the depth of harm that there may be
differences there does that factor in um
how should that factor in the
differences of opinion um I think that's
all an issue that will be ongoing in
terms of also um scope and breath of
competitive harm for um so I think
there's a host of issues as you pointed
out that are not clearly articulated or
um determined um as of now I I'd like to
move on to um Miss Kim and and I think
this actually
L ties in with a point that you raised
earlier in terms of um speed so together
with injunctive relief I think another
um at least Hope from the kfdc was that
burden shifting would result in
Expediting uh enforcement as well and so
um and that relates to establishment of
competitive harm and there are several
um approaches to uh establishing anti-ed
effects uh once again the traditional
you know the competition agency has to
prove everything so that would be the
traditional approach there is also um a
new approach uh that is being pushed uh
by Shifting the burden of proof um to
the platform operator or for example
there could also be an approach of
lowering the standard of proof while
still placing it on the competition
agency and and and I suppose there there
would be other approaches as well
so if the KFC goes ahead with this
platform law or some form of platform
regulation um do you think or should the
ktc to be affected now now um granted
there there will be you know some uh
adverse effects or some uh uh concerns
there but um to be effective should the
kfdc change adjust the burden of proof
if they were to transition to something
more akin to xmt regulation um or if so
what changes would be
necessary okay thank you Professor IM
uh uh as a conclusion I would like to
say the exan regulation does not always
mean the shift of the burden of proof to
all online platforms and I'd like to
compare these three types of leg ation
we have right now the first of all the
EU dma is many people understand they're
a very
high uh standard lower standard for the
platform platform operators the burden
of proof is basically shifted to the uh
platform operators in terms of the
exante designation of
Gatekeepers why is it it because it
basically based on quantitative
thresholds whether it is a core platform
service provider or annual turnover or
active users those are you know the
quantitative thresholds easily Pro Prov
by the competition agencies and there
are also some exceptions re by the
platform operators are allowed but they
have to uh appr exceptional
circumstances not to be designated as a
Gatekeepers so it's basically the burden
shifting by the competition agencies and
EC may still designate other platform
operators although they do not know
satisfy all the quantitative thresholds
so there is a plenty of room for the
competition agencies but in contrast uh
the new law issued by the UK CMA the
dmcc the digital markets competition and
consumer
acts although it follows the same exan
designation of a company with a
strategic Market status so-called SMS it
has it has taken a different approach so
it does not follow the quantitative
threshold it it is basically the
qualitative assessment of the market
power and with one exception there's a
minimum turn turnover thresholds but
basically it is all related to the uh
substantial and entranet Market power of
a company and I think the interesting
thing is that uh along with this uh
designation of code of conducts it is
specifically linked to a digital
activity by a company not a general
prevision so the competition agency took
the burden of proof on either whether it
is SMS or whether how what kind of
conduct should be included in the code
of conducts or bears the burden on the
competition
agencies uh the proposed amendment by
the kftc although we haven't seen that
any details of the draft bill I think
it's similar to the current presumption
of dominance with a higher bar of
quantitative thresholds we we don't know
how it will be specifically dealt with
in the uh draft Bill unless it is it
designates some list of companies I
think it will work very similar to the
current system of uh presumption of
dominance under the mrfa
but with the exception of this minimum
turn turnover threshold and number of
user there there's a new standard but I
think basically it will be same same
similar and kftc has the burden of
proving especially the key here is the
how to define the relevant market and
assess the market share and Market power
so I think it's in line with the current
legislation but we will see how it
differs from the current legislation
when we see the actual
bill and I think personally believe the
burden appr proof for anti-competitive
effects somehow should lie on uh
competition agency because we are
dealing we are not dealing with industry
regulator but we are dealing with
competition agencies so we may lower the
stand of standard of burden of proof but
still at least some part some part needs
to be proven by by the competition
agency but in eud dma's case
uh as uh Dr J
mentioned critically ship the bur proof
by requiring comp compliance reporting
from designated
Gatekeepers but as I mentioned UK dmcc
takes a different approach they are the
one who sets up the code of conduct for
Specific Enterprise for specific
conducts so uh as you mentioned in order
to have the efficiency only KFC may take
the route lower burden of proof for
these super dominance firms in on online
platform areas but I I think at least
some part of Burden approv should be on
the kftc and platform operator will be
given the opportunity to rebut but I
don't know what they mean in their press
release that the operators will be given
sufficient opportunity to reut so I'm
also wondering how it will will be
crafted into the actual bills that's my
response thank you
um thank you for those insights I I
think um all of us uh today agree that
there is really a lack of clarity right
now just based on the press release and
um Dean Le um as a final question um I'd
like to actually um pivot from what uh
Miss Kim had just said based based on um
you know ex an um expost and that so um
clearly it's not really clear whether
whether Korean platform uh law proposal
by the KFC currently stands whether you
could actually confidently um categorize
it as exanti or not um it it certainly
does have the potential to be wielded
like an exanti approach as Attorney Kim
and Dr Jung pointed out um but
nonetheless I think you know X anti and
expost is really a Hot Topic right now
around the world and I think it's
actually um proding compeition agencies
to to to reflect on who they really are
um and and there's a question of well
you know the traditional Expos
competition agency evidence-based
approach didn't really work that well at
least for digital markets and so we
should move now towards a more
regulatory agency approach or something
more hybrid and so you have these uh law
proposals coming out and and and trying
to hand these agencies with new tools
that look more like a regulatory uh
agency but um if we are going to
transition or at
least um uh you might say evolve into
sort of a new uh digital markets related
entity by a competition agency um
what do competition authorities need to
do to effectively adapt undertake the
necessary changes and really do a smart
and and do its job
well uh I think you have to
unmute okay thank you very much for the
very good question of course and you
said
competition authorities should adapt to
the new
rule and the capabilities required to
enforce new exan regulatory tools about
digital platforms are quite
different I think that exact regulation
of a specific industry will typically
require more ex expertise and experience
in the given
area then
as in the case of the existing
characteristics as a general expost
regulator for and cion
Authority
uh as a rule of Z general cion
authorities do not typically have
technical expertise over
specific
industry particularly the business of
digital platforms involves a wide range
of cutting age Tech technolog and
Regulators are expected to understand
the characteristics of that
industry and given the complexity of the
digital platforms that works with on the
basis of artificial intelligence Big
Data handling and various Hardware
including
semiconductors comption authorities
should expand the expertise in their
field and one of the most important
resources they need will should be the
professionals who truly understand the
industry I want to emphasize the skill
to communicate with other sectoral
regulators and
society and general
Citizen and one of the concerns of the
exatic regulation over digital platforms
is the increasing concerns of the a
general concentration
that may
undermine various
interests Beyond economic vales for
example the Democratic political system
or a economic and political
sovereignty and to perform such a
mission that is very new to existing
anti-terrorist authorities they will
need to communicate effectively and
efficiently with the corresponding
industry society and even politics and
there is quite different characteristics
and expertise they have so
far and focusing on the case of Korea as
I said the ktc is not a simple
competition Authority
already according to the Korean inous
law the
kfdc is expecting
and mandated to enforce three different
field of
regulatory works one is the conventional
anti trust and two is
the regulations of the general
concentration number three is the
regulation over the Capal or soal
asvp and and the asbp has been a
particularized and reflected in several
particular enactment like the
subcontract law franchise law so there
is quite different characteristics from
any other anti authorities in the
world and it suggests that the KC
already have significant abilities and
exper experence of over 40 years that
are required by
sector specific Regulators so the kfdc
can be considered to be in a a better
position and then most of other
competition authorities in the world but
in any event to keeping other antitrust
authorities they have to learn and adapt
to the new environment as you have
suggested thank
you thank you so um it is 12 p.m. but we
did uh start a few minutes late and and
I understand that there is also a
question from the floor um so Professor
Kong um I'll hand it over to
you okay so so let's um briefly talk
about the question U from the
participant which is does the Korean
government's platform or digital related
policy tend to follow Global Trends
aligned with those in EU and and in the
United States States or does it try to
stick with the local
needs any responses from the
panelists maybe I can add a line I think
is a half and half
and
uh many critics in Korean
they have a view that
ktc is excessively inged to follow the
socalled the the brzil
effect so the
their proposals to adopt a new
exante uh regulation over digital
[Music]
platforms are based upon a
foreign demand r than local demand so
many have argued that KC should
listen to the local industry and local
demand for any
new regulations so I understand that the
ktc
have listened to the voice and recently
they have announced that they will give
up the introdu introduction of the p
exam
regulation so I totally agree with that
new attitude of
ktc so but we again we
have we have to understand that we have
a very strong local voice from the uh
small and medium uh firms and consumers
in the Korea that
argues a a strong regulation over the
abuse of powers of the
large Market platforms so I think the my
answer is the half and half and the cap
has a very difficult mission to solve
the the potentially conflicting goals
thank
you uh this is Young if I may I just to
uh supplement what the U Professor Lee
had to say
uh a lot of people are uh saying um
because of the process effect as
Professor
mentioned um different countries trying
to adopt a exan regulations on the
platform but if we look um a bit uh know
closely into all of these
laws um you all of these laws
are uh adopted to reflect upon what is
needed in the particular
jurisdictions you know there are
spectrum of the uh uh in exent
regulations as I explained and then uh
you know all the participants
explained the
udma uh UK dmca and then German
competition law uh 198 and then Japanese
uh smartphone uh you know sector rate
legislations and then the one that kept
it proposed
they have a different needs local needs
to uh reflect upon the direction of the
exante regulations one more then one one
final to I might add um this is related
to uh huna's uh
observations about of
the um the Practical implications of cap
demand uh the leg
Bill uh I think the
uh of course um you're right that uh
because existing
laws uh already
addressing uh the
issues um uh in the drafted bill but
practical implications of the C this
bill you know would be uh you for my
standpoint is that the if the burden
isn't shifted uh to
parties uh I think all extented
regulation is one another is burden
shifting
then uh you know the parties a pressure
to cooperate with The
Regulators uh to you know uh you know
get themselves off the
hook uh
so the the entire process of know
defense by the power is will be quite
different and then it will have
long-term implications for uh the
companies subject to this
regulations thank you um so we are now
over um Time by 12 minutes but I didn't
want to end things without giving
um Attorney Kim and Professor Nam a
chance to uh reflect or at least make
their final comments so um V Kim or
Professor Nam um any departing comments
that you would like to make before we
wrap
up oh my last comments is that uh I also
agree with uh Dr jong's comments that
the burden shifting will affect uh the
defense strategy and the future uh
business of the possible subject of the
investigation by the competition
agencies and we'd like to see the the
specific draft of the uh kftc you know
as soon as possible to analyze the
actual impact of how how Buton shifting
will occur under this quisi exante no I
don't know whether it's exante or expost
enforcement but I'd like to see the
actual bill and what what the specific
ideas the kftc has in mind no giving
this super dominant firms act it only
says that more than 75% is is usually
not the Super dominance but it does not
mention anything about the competitive
effects of these firms and how it will
be know it will it may lessen the burden
of proving the competive compet
anti-competitive effects of conduct by
such super dominant firms so it's we are
still we are very unclear about the
KFC's enforcement Direction Al although
we have this press release by the
KFC thank you Professor n
um for some reason I'm not hearing um
you
but okay thank you no I just said you
know I don't have any further comments
for already over time thank you all
right so again um there were a lot of
nuances that came out today and I I do
want to spend at least one or two
minutes um distilling this for the
benefit of the audience because it's
it's it's rare that we have an
opportunity to get these four on the
same panel to disc us so I think what
the panel discussed today uh everyone
agreed that it's difficult to
characterize or pin down what the kfdc
approach actually is so um one thing for
sure and everybody agrees is that it
does try to move away from an EMA uh dma
EU type really pure exanti push type of
Regulation at the same time I think as
Dr Jong and others pointed out uh the
way that it's implemented does have or
could have um the results that are that
closely mirrors what an exante
regulation would or could be another
point that came out today and I think
it's very important is that you really
heard how uh the KFC actually does act
like like a quasi regulator already uh
how it already does have a lot of tools
and as Professor Nan pointed out it does
focus on policy issues that would
traditionally be uh viewed as outside
the purview of a conventional
competition Agency for good or For Worse
um basically reflecting uh the realities
of what is happening on the ground in
Korea so as the panels uh panelists
pointed out uh the KFC is currently
grappling with this and I think um what
it actually shows today I think the the
probably the takeaway point the most
important point is that the KFC has not
finalized the text as I understand it is
still working on it is still you know
will be going through multiple rounds of
review also feedback from outside and so
um we'll have to see how um things shake
out uh I think discussions like today
and insights that are provided through
these fora and other opportunities will
be important in the sense that we're all
trying to see what is the proper
approach for Korea so definitely as
profess as Dr Jong and others pointed
out um Korea does need a different
approach I think also everybody as as
Dean Ley was also pointing out that um
Korea does want a a different approach
but what is that approach what should be
done um and how to actually specifically
spell that out as Attorney Kim was uh
requesting will be a challenge and so um
we hope that today's discussion does
contribute to that discourse and again
we are very grateful for um the
initiative taken by the USC Marshall um
Initiative for digital competition in uh
bringing us together and we were um we
at snua a policy initiative was very
honored and pleased to co-host um this
webinar and um with that um I I'd like
to thank our excellent uh panelists
again for their discussion for their
insights and we hope that we will have
future opportunities to hear from you uh
again thank you very much everyone uh
for and and and I apologize for going
over time thank you very much um CH do
you want any final um departing remarks
no thank you all right so we'll see you
again and thank you very much thank you
bye thank you thank you

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